| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: Detect system inodes linked into directory hierarchy
When UDF filesystem is corrupted, hidden system inodes can be linked
into directory hierarchy which is an avenue for further serious
corruption of the filesystem and kernel confusion as noticed by syzbot
fuzzed images. Refuse to access system inodes linked into directory
hierarchy and vice versa. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen: speed up grant-table reclaim
When a grant entry is still in use by the remote domain, Linux must put
it on a deferred list. Normally, this list is very short, because
the PV network and block protocols expect the backend to unmap the grant
first. However, Qubes OS's GUI protocol is subject to the constraints
of the X Window System, and as such winds up with the frontend unmapping
the window first. As a result, the list can grow very large, resulting
in a massive memory leak and eventual VM freeze.
To partially solve this problem, make the number of entries that the VM
will attempt to free at each iteration tunable. The default is still
10, but it can be overridden via a module parameter.
This is Cc: stable because (when combined with appropriate userspace
changes) it fixes a severe performance and stability problem for Qubes
OS users. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix NULL pointer dereference on fastopen early fallback
In case of early fallback to TCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() deletes
the subflow context before returning the newly allocated sock to
the caller.
The fastopen path does not cope with the above unconditionally
dereferencing the subflow context. |
| VestaCP commit a3f0fa1 (2018-05-31) up to commit ee03eff (2018-06-13) contain embedded malicious code that resulted in a supply-chain compromise. New installations created from the compromised installer since at least May 2018 were subject to installation of Linux/ChachaDDoS, a multi-stage DDoS bot that uses Lua for second- and third-stage components. The compromise leaked administrative credentials (base64-encoded admin password and server domain) to an external URL during installation and/or resulted in the installer dropping and executing a DDoS malware payload under local system privileges. Compromised servers were subsequently observed participating in large-scale DDoS activity. Vesta acknowledged exploitation in the wild in October 2018. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use correct encap attribute during invalidation
With introduction of post action infrastructure most of the users of encap
attribute had been modified in order to obtain the correct attribute by
calling mlx5e_tc_get_encap_attr() helper instead of assuming encap action
is always on default attribute. However, the cited commit didn't modify
mlx5e_invalidate_encap() which prevents it from destroying correct modify
header action which leads to a warning [0]. Fix the issue by using correct
attribute.
[0]:
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 654 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c:684 mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x1cc/0x230 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x1cc/0x230 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: <TASK>
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x8e3/0x1f60 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows+0xe0/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lock_downgrade+0x6d0/0x6d0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3f0/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: use work to update rate to avoid RCU warning
The ieee80211_ops::sta_rc_update must be atomic, because
ieee80211_chan_bw_change() holds rcu_read lock while calling
drv_sta_rc_update(), so create a work to do original things.
Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4621 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318
rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0
CPU: 0 PID: 4621 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W OE
Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_chswitch_work [mac80211]
RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0xb0/0x1460
? __mod_timer+0x116/0x360
schedule+0x5a/0xc0
schedule_timeout+0x87/0x150
? trace_raw_output_tick_stop+0x60/0x60
wait_for_completion_timeout+0x7b/0x140
usb_start_wait_urb+0x82/0x160 [usbcore
usb_control_msg+0xe3/0x140 [usbcore
rtw_usb_read+0x88/0xe0 [rtw_usb
rtw_usb_read8+0xf/0x10 [rtw_usb
rtw_fw_send_h2c_command+0xa0/0x170 [rtw_core
rtw_fw_send_ra_info+0xc9/0xf0 [rtw_core
drv_sta_rc_update+0x7c/0x160 [mac80211
ieee80211_chan_bw_change+0xfb/0x110 [mac80211
ieee80211_change_chanctx+0x38/0x130 [mac80211
ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_switch+0x34e/0x900 [mac80211
ieee80211_link_use_reserved_context+0x88/0xe0 [mac80211
ieee80211_chswitch_work+0x95/0x170 [mac80211
process_one_work+0x201/0x410
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0
? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kthread+0xe1/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix BUG in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa() due to overflow
When we calculate the end position of ext4_free_extent, this position may
be exactly where ext4_lblk_t (i.e. uint) overflows. For example, if
ac_g_ex.fe_logical is 4294965248 and ac_orig_goal_len is 2048, then the
computed end is 0x100000000, which is 0. If ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical is not
the first case of adjusting the best extent, that is, new_bex_end > 0, the
following BUG_ON will be triggered:
=========================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5116!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 673 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G E 6.5.0-rc1+ #279
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_new_inode_pa+0xc5/0x430
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_mb_use_best_found+0x203/0x2f0
ext4_mb_try_best_found+0x163/0x240
ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x158/0x1550
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x86a/0xe10
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xb0c/0x13a0
ext4_map_blocks+0x2cd/0x8f0
ext4_iomap_begin+0x27b/0x400
iomap_iter+0x222/0x3d0
__iomap_dio_rw+0x243/0xcb0
iomap_dio_rw+0x16/0x80
=========================================================
A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem:
mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda -b 4096 100M
mount /dev/sda /tmp/test
fallocate -l1M /tmp/test/tmp
fallocate -l10M /tmp/test/file
fallocate -i -o 1M -l16777203M /tmp/test/file
fsstress -d /tmp/test -l 0 -n 100000 -p 8 &
sleep 10 && killall -9 fsstress
rm -f /tmp/test/tmp
xfs_io -c "open -ad /tmp/test/file" -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 8192"
We simply refactor the logic for adjusting the best extent by adding
a temporary ext4_free_extent ex and use extent_logical_end() to avoid
overflow, which also simplifies the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix to call f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback() in f2fs_write_raw_pages()
BUG_ON() will be triggered when writing files concurrently,
because the same page is writtenback multiple times.
1597 void folio_end_writeback(struct folio *folio)
1598 {
......
1618 if (!__folio_end_writeback(folio))
1619 BUG();
......
1625 }
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1619!
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_write_end_io+0x1a0/0x370
blk_update_request+0x6c/0x410
blk_mq_end_request+0x15/0x130
blk_complete_reqs+0x3c/0x50
__do_softirq+0xb8/0x29b
? sort_range+0x20/0x20
run_ksoftirqd+0x19/0x20
smpboot_thread_fn+0x10b/0x1d0
kthread+0xde/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Below is the concurrency scenario:
[Process A] [Process B] [Process C]
f2fs_write_raw_pages()
- redirty_page_for_writepage()
- unlock page()
f2fs_do_write_data_page()
- lock_page()
- clear_page_dirty_for_io()
- set_page_writeback() [1st writeback]
.....
- unlock page()
generic_perform_write()
- f2fs_write_begin()
- wait_for_stable_page()
- f2fs_write_end()
- set_page_dirty()
- lock_page()
- f2fs_do_write_data_page()
- set_page_writeback() [2st writeback]
This problem was introduced by the previous commit 7377e853967b ("f2fs:
compress: fix potential deadlock of compress file"). All pagelocks were
released in f2fs_write_raw_pages(), but whether the page was
in the writeback state was ignored in the subsequent writing process.
Let's fix it by waiting for the page to writeback before writing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer
Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in indx_insert_into_buffer+0xaa3/0x13b0
fs/ntfs3/index.c:1755
Read of size 17168 at addr ffff8880255e06c0 by task syz-executor308/3630
Call Trace:
<TASK>
memmove+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:54
indx_insert_into_buffer+0xaa3/0x13b0 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1755
indx_insert_entry+0x446/0x6b0 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1863
ntfs_create_inode+0x1d3f/0x35c0 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:1548
ntfs_create+0x3e/0x60 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:100
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline]
If the member struct INDEX_BUFFER *index of struct indx_node is
incorrect, that is, the value of __le32 used is greater than the value
of __le32 total in struct INDEX_HDR. Therefore, OOB read occurs when
memmove is called in indx_insert_into_buffer().
Fix this by adding a check in hdr_find_e(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Check if ffa_driver remove is present before executing
Currently ffa_drv->remove() is called unconditionally from
ffa_device_remove(). Since the driver registration doesn't check for it
and allows it to be registered without .remove callback, we need to check
for the presence of it before executing it from ffa_device_remove() to
above a NULL pointer dereference like the one below:
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
| Mem abort info:
| ESR = 0x0000000086000004
| EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
| SET = 0, FnV = 0
| EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000881cc8000
| [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| CPU: 3 PID: 130 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7 #6
| Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT)
| pstate: 63402809 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
| pc : 0x0
| lr : ffa_device_remove+0x20/0x2c
| Call trace:
| 0x0
| device_release_driver_internal+0x16c/0x260
| driver_detach+0x90/0xd0
| bus_remove_driver+0xdc/0x11c
| driver_unregister+0x30/0x54
| ffa_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
| cleanup_module+0x18/0xeec
| __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x234/0x378
| invoke_syscall+0x40/0x108
| el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf0
| do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa4
| el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
| el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Add a length limitation for the ivrs_acpihid command-line parameter
The 'acpiid' buffer in the parse_ivrs_acpihid function may overflow,
because the string specifier in the format string sscanf()
has no width limitation.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: fix possible NULL pointer dereference
It is possible that iwl_pci_probe() will fail and free the trans,
then afterwards iwl_pci_remove() will be called and crash by trying
to access trans which is already freed, fix it.
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Detected crf-id 0xa5a5a5a2, cnv-id 0xa5a5a5a2
wfpm id 0xa5a5a5a2
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Can't find a correct rfid for crf id 0x5a2
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
...
RIP: 0010:iwl_pci_remove+0x12/0x30 [iwlwifi]
pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0
device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0
driver_detach+0x4c/0x90
bus_remove_driver+0x5c/0xd0
driver_unregister+0x31/0x50
pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
iwl_pci_unregister_driver+0x15/0x20 [iwlwifi]
__exit_compat+0x9/0x98 [iwlwifi]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x147/0x260 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Prevent handling any completions after qp destroy
HW may generate completions that indicates QP is destroyed.
Driver should not be scheduling any more completion handlers
for this QP, after the QP is destroyed. Since CQs are active
during the QP destroy, driver may still schedule completion
handlers. This can cause a race where the destroy_cq and poll_cq
running simultaneously.
Snippet of kernel panic while doing bnxt_re driver load unload in loop.
This indicates a poll after the CQ is freed.
[77786.481636] Call Trace:
[77786.481640] <TASK>
[77786.481644] bnxt_re_poll_cq+0x14a/0x620 [bnxt_re]
[77786.481658] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[77786.481693] __ib_process_cq+0x57/0x190 [ib_core]
[77786.481728] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core]
[77786.481761] process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0
[77786.481768] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0
[77786.481785] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481790] kthread+0xe2/0x110
[77786.481794] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[77786.481797] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
To avoid this, complete all completion handlers before returning the
destroy QP. If free_cq is called soon after destroy_qp, IB stack
will cancel the CQ work before invoking the destroy_cq verb and
this will prevent any race mentioned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: dw_hdmi: cleanup drm encoder during unbind
This fixes a use-after-free crash during rmmod.
The DRM encoder is embedded inside the larger rockchip_hdmi,
which is allocated with the component. The component memory
gets freed before the main drm device is destroyed. Fix it
by running encoder cleanup before tearing down its container.
[moved encoder cleanup above clk_disable, similar to bind-error-path] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix possible soft lockup in __audit_inode_child()
Tracefs or debugfs maybe cause hundreds to thousands of PATH records,
too many PATH records maybe cause soft lockup.
For example:
1. CONFIG_KASAN=y && CONFIG_PREEMPTION=n
2. auditctl -a exit,always -S open -k key
3. sysctl -w kernel.watchdog_thresh=5
4. mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test
There may be a soft lockup as follows:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 7s! [mkdir:15498]
Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack+0x11c/0x174
panic+0x27c/0x494
watchdog_timer_fn+0x2bc/0x390
__run_hrtimer+0x148/0x4fc
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x154/0x210
hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c4/0x760
arch_timer_handler_phys+0x48/0x60
handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xe0/0x340
__handle_domain_irq+0xbc/0x130
gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x460
el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
__audit_inode_child+0x240/0x7bc
tracefs_create_file+0x1b8/0x2a0
trace_create_file+0x18/0x50
event_create_dir+0x204/0x30c
__trace_add_new_event+0xac/0x100
event_trace_add_tracer+0xa0/0x130
trace_array_create_dir+0x60/0x140
trace_array_create+0x1e0/0x370
instance_mkdir+0x90/0xd0
tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x68/0xa0
vfs_mkdir+0x21c/0x34c
do_mkdirat+0x1b4/0x1d4
__arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x4c/0x60
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa8/0x240
do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xc0
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4
el0_sync+0x160/0x180
Therefore, we add cond_resched() to __audit_inode_child() to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio - Fix race on data_avail and actual data
The virtio rng device kicks off a new entropy request whenever the
data available reaches zero. When a new request occurs at the end
of a read operation, that is, when the result of that request is
only needed by the next reader, then there is a race between the
writing of the new data and the next reader.
This is because there is no synchronisation whatsoever between the
writer and the reader.
Fix this by writing data_avail with smp_store_release and reading
it with smp_load_acquire when we first enter read. The subsequent
reads are safe because they're either protected by the first load
acquire, or by the completion mechanism.
Also remove the redundant zeroing of data_idx in random_recv_done
(data_idx must already be zero at this point) and data_avail in
request_entropy (ditto). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, Fix internal port memory leak
The flow rule can be splited, and the extra post_act rules are added
to post_act table. It's possible to trigger memleak when the rule
forwards packets from internal port and over tunnel, in the case that,
for example, CT 'new' state offload is allowed. As int_port object is
assigned to the flow attribute of post_act rule, and its refcnt is
incremented by mlx5e_tc_int_port_get(), but mlx5e_tc_int_port_put() is
not called, the refcnt is never decremented, then int_port is never
freed.
The kmemleak reports the following error:
unreferenced object 0xffff888128204b80 (size 64):
comm "handler20", pid 50121, jiffies 4296973009 (age 642.932s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 03 f0 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................
98 77 67 41 81 88 ff ff 98 77 67 41 81 88 ff ff .wgA.....wgA....
backtrace:
[<00000000e992680d>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0x120
[<000000009e945a98>] mlx5e_tc_int_port_get+0x3f3/0xe20 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000035a537f0>] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x473/0xcf0 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000070c2cec6>] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x7cf/0xe90 [mlx5_core]
[<000000005cc84048>] mlx5e_configure_flower+0xd40/0x4c40 [mlx5_core]
[<000000004f8a2031>] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload.isra.0+0x10e/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[<000000007df797dc>] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb+0x90/0x130 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000016c15cc3>] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1cf/0x410
[<00000000a63305b4>] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x38f/0x670 [cls_flower]
[<000000008bc9e77c>] fl_change+0x1fd5/0x4430 [cls_flower]
[<00000000e7f766e4>] tc_new_tfilter+0x867/0x2010
[<00000000e101c0ef>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fc/0x9f0
[<00000000e1111d44>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
[<0000000082dd6c8b>] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710
[<00000000fc568f70>] netlink_sendmsg+0x794/0xc50
[<0000000016e92590>] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
So fix this by moving int_port cleanup code to the flow attribute
free helper, which is used by all the attribute free cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: r8712: Fix memory leak in _r8712_init_xmit_priv()
In the above mentioned routine, memory is allocated in several places.
If the first succeeds and a later one fails, the routine will leak memory.
This patch fixes commit 2865d42c78a9 ("staging: r8712u: Add the new driver
to the mainline kernel"). A potential memory leak in
r8712_xmit_resource_alloc() is also addressed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix assertion of exclop condition when starting balance
Balance as exclusive state is compatible with paused balance and device
add, which makes some things more complicated. The assertion of valid
states when starting from paused balance needs to take into account two
more states, the combinations can be hit when there are several threads
racing to start balance and device add. This won't typically happen when
the commands are started from command line.
Scenario 1: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE.
Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_finish executed finishes before assertion in
btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE state which lead to assertion failed:
fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD,
in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:456
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_exclop_balance+0x13c/0x310
? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Scenario 2: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED.
Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and
btrfs_exclop_balance executed finish before the latter thread execute
assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to
BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED state which lead to assertion failed:
fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE ||
fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD ||
fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE,
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410
? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0
? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20
btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320
btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0
? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210
do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
An example of the failed assertion is below, which shows that the
paused balance is also needed to be checked.
root@syzkaller:/home/xsk# ./repro
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.611428][ T7970] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 0
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.613973][ T7971] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.615456][ T7972] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.617528][ T7973] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.618359][ T7974] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.622589][ T7975] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.624034][ T7976] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.626420][ T7977] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.627643][ T7978] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14
[ 416.629006][ T7979] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
[ 416.630298][ T7980] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3
Fai
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix memory leak in binder_init()
In binder_init(), the destruction of binder_alloc_shrinker_init() is not
performed in the wrong path, which will cause memory leaks. So this commit
introduces binder_alloc_shrinker_exit() and calls it in the wrong path to
fix that. |
