| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: fix a race issue related to the operation on bpf_bound_progs list
The netdevsim driver lacks a protection mechanism for operations on the
bpf_bound_progs list. When the nsim_bpf_create_prog() performs
list_add_tail, it is possible that nsim_bpf_destroy_prog() is
simultaneously performs list_del. Concurrent operations on the list may
lead to list corruption and trigger a kernel crash as follows:
[ 417.290971] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:62!
[ 417.290983] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 417.290992] CPU: 10 PID: 168 Comm: kworker/10:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5 #1
[ 417.291003] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 417.291007] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
[ 417.291021] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xa7/0xc0
[ 417.291034] Code: a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 ca 48 c7 c7 48 a1 eb ae e8 ed fb a8 ff 0f 0b 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 80 a1 eb ae e8 d9 fb a8 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 d0 a1 eb ae 48 89 f2 48 89 c6 e8 c2 fb a8
[ 417.291040] RSP: 0018:ffffb16a40807df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 417.291046] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff8e589866f500 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 417.291051] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e59f7b23180 RDI: ffff8e59f7b23180
[ 417.291055] RBP: ffffb16a412c9000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
[ 417.291059] R10: ffffb16a40807c80 R11: ffffffffaf9edce8 R12: ffff8e594427ac20
[ 417.291063] R13: ffff8e59f7b44780 R14: ffff8e58800b7a05 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 417.291074] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e59f7b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 417.291079] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 417.291083] CR2: 00007fc4083efe08 CR3: 00000001c3626006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 417.291088] PKRU: 55555554
[ 417.291091] Call Trace:
[ 417.291096] <TASK>
[ 417.291103] nsim_bpf_destroy_prog+0x31/0x80 [netdevsim]
[ 417.291154] __bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0x2a/0x80
[ 417.291163] bpf_prog_dev_bound_destroy+0x6f/0xb0
[ 417.291171] bpf_prog_free_deferred+0x18e/0x1a0
[ 417.291178] process_one_work+0x18a/0x3a0
[ 417.291188] worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
[ 417.291197] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 417.291207] kthread+0xe5/0x120
[ 417.291214] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 417.291221] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
[ 417.291230] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 417.291236] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 417.291246] </TASK>
Add a mutex lock, to prevent simultaneous addition and deletion operations
on the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: synopsys: dw-dp: fix error paths of dw_dp_bind
Fix several issues in dw_dp_bind() error handling:
1. Missing return after drm_bridge_attach() failure - the function
continued execution instead of returning an error.
2. Resource leak: drm_dp_aux_register() is not a devm function, so
drm_dp_aux_unregister() must be called on all error paths after
aux registration succeeds. This affects errors from:
- drm_bridge_attach()
- phy_init()
- devm_add_action_or_reset()
- platform_get_irq()
- devm_request_threaded_irq()
3. Bug fix: platform_get_irq() returns the IRQ number or a negative
error code, but the error path was returning ERR_PTR(ret) instead
of ERR_PTR(dp->irq).
Use a goto label for cleanup to ensure consistent error handling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix race in nvmet_bio_done() leading to NULL pointer dereference
There is a race condition in nvmet_bio_done() that can cause a NULL
pointer dereference in blk_cgroup_bio_start():
1. nvmet_bio_done() is called when a bio completes
2. nvmet_req_complete() is called, which invokes req->ops->queue_response(req)
3. The queue_response callback can re-queue and re-submit the same request
4. The re-submission reuses the same inline_bio from nvmet_req
5. Meanwhile, nvmet_req_bio_put() (called after nvmet_req_complete)
invokes bio_uninit() for inline_bio, which sets bio->bi_blkg to NULL
6. The re-submitted bio enters submit_bio_noacct_nocheck()
7. blk_cgroup_bio_start() dereferences bio->bi_blkg, causing a crash:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
RIP: 0010:blk_cgroup_bio_start+0x10/0xd0
Call Trace:
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x44/0x250
nvmet_bdev_execute_rw+0x254/0x370 [nvmet]
process_one_work+0x193/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x281/0x3a0
Fix this by reordering nvmet_bio_done() to call nvmet_req_bio_put()
BEFORE nvmet_req_complete(). This ensures the bio is cleaned up before
the request can be re-submitted, preventing the race condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/nvm: Fix double-free on aux add failure
After a successful auxiliary_device_init(), aux_dev->dev.release
(xe_nvm_release_dev()) is responsible for the kfree(nvm). When
there is failure with auxiliary_device_add(), driver will call
auxiliary_device_uninit(), which call put_device(). So that the
.release callback will be triggered to free the memory associated
with the auxiliary_device.
Move the kfree(nvm) into the auxiliary_device_init() failure path
and remove the err goto path to fix below error.
"
[ 13.232905] ==================================================================
[ 13.232911] BUG: KASAN: double-free in xe_nvm_init+0x751/0xf10 [xe]
[ 13.233112] Free of addr ffff888120635000 by task systemd-udevd/273
[ 13.233120] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 273 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-lgci-xe-kernel+ #225 PREEMPT(voluntary)
...
[ 13.233125] Call Trace:
[ 13.233126] <TASK>
[ 13.233127] dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0xc0
[ 13.233132] print_report+0xce/0x610
[ 13.233136] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x5d/0x1e0
[ 13.233139] ? xe_nvm_init+0x751/0xf10 [xe]
...
"
v2: drop err goto path. (Alexander)
(cherry picked from commit a3187c0c2bbd947ffff97f90d077ac88f9c2a215) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, delete flows only for existing peers
When deleting TC steering flows, iterate only over actual devcom
peers instead of assuming all possible ports exist. This avoids
touching non-existent peers and ensures cleanup is limited to
devices the driver is currently connected to.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 133c8a067 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
CPU: 19 UID: 0 PID: 2169 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.18.0+ #156 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peers_flow+0xbe/0x200 [mlx5_core]
Code: 00 00 a8 08 74 a8 49 8b 46 18 f6 c4 02 74 9f 4c 8d bf a0 12 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 0e e7 96 e1 49 8b 44 24 08 49 8b 0c 24 4c 89 ff <48> 89 41 08 48 89 08 49 89 2c 24 49 89 5c 24 08 e8 7d ce 96 e1 49
RSP: 0018:ff11000143867528 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ff11000143691580 RSI: ff110001026e5000 RDI: ff11000106f3d2a0
RBP: dead000000000100 R08: 00000000000003fd R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ff11000101c75690 R11: ff1100085faea178 R12: ff11000115f0ae78
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff11000115f0a800 R15: ff11000106f3d2a0
FS: 00007f35236bf740(0000) GS:ff110008dc809000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000157a01001 CR4: 0000000000373eb0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x46/0x270 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_delete_flower+0x2a6/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x20/0x80
fl_reoffload+0x26f/0x2f0 [cls_flower]
? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x9e/0x1c0
tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0
tcf_block_setup+0x186/0x1d0
tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xef/0x130
tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70
__tcf_block_put+0x85/0x160
ingress_destroy+0x32/0x110 [sch_ingress]
__qdisc_destroy+0x44/0x100
qdisc_graft+0x22b/0x610
tc_get_qdisc+0x183/0x4d0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2d7/0x3d0
? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x100/0x100
netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
netlink_unicast+0x249/0x320
? __alloc_skb+0x102/0x1f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1e3/0x420
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x1ef/0x230
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6c/0xa0
___sys_sendmsg+0x7f/0xc0
? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0xc0
? __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180
__sys_sendmsg+0x61/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x640
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f35238bb764
Code: 15 b9 86 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d e5 08 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffed4c35638 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a2efcc75e0 RCX: 00007f35238bb764
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed4c356a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffed4c35710 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 00007f3523984b20
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffed4c35790
R13: 000000006947df8f R14: 000055a2efcc75e0 R15: 00007ffed4c35780 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: core: fix race condition against transaction list
The list of transaction is enumerated without acquiring card lock when
processing AR response event. This causes a race condition bug when
processing AT request completion event concurrently.
This commit fixes the bug by put timer start for split transaction
expiration into the scope of lock. The value of jiffies in card structure
is referred before acquiring the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix null-ptr-deref in hci_uart_write_work
hci_uart_set_proto() sets HCI_UART_PROTO_INIT before calling
hci_uart_register_dev(), which calls proto->open() to initialize
hu->priv. However, if a TTY write wakeup occurs during this window,
hci_uart_tx_wakeup() may schedule write_work before hu->priv is
initialized, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in
hci_uart_write_work() when proto->dequeue() accesses hu->priv.
The race condition is:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
hci_uart_set_proto()
set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_INIT)
hci_uart_register_dev()
tty write wakeup
hci_uart_tty_wakeup()
hci_uart_tx_wakeup()
schedule_work(&hu->write_work)
proto->open(hu)
// initializes hu->priv
hci_uart_write_work()
hci_uart_dequeue()
proto->dequeue(hu)
// accesses hu->priv (NULL!)
Fix this by moving set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_INIT) after proto->open()
succeeds, ensuring hu->priv is initialized before any work can be
scheduled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop
Currently this is checked before running the pending work. Normally this
is quite fine, as work items either end up blocking (which will create a
new worker for other items), or they complete fairly quickly. But syzbot
reports an issue where io-wq takes seemingly forever to exit, and with a
bit of debugging, this turns out to be because it queues a bunch of big
(2GB - 4096b) reads with a /dev/msr* file. Since this file type doesn't
support ->read_iter(), loop_rw_iter() ends up handling them. Each read
returns 16MB of data read, which takes 20 (!!) seconds. With a bunch of
these pending, processing the whole chain can take a long time. Easily
longer than the syzbot uninterruptible sleep timeout of 140 seconds.
This then triggers a complaint off the io-wq exit path:
INFO: task syz.4.135:6326 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
Blocked by coredump.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.4.135 state:D stack:26824 pid:6326 tgid:6324 ppid:5957 task_flags:0x400548 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x1139/0x6150 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6945 [inline]
schedule+0xe7/0x3a0 kernel/sched/core.c:6960
schedule_timeout+0x257/0x290 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:75
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:100 [inline]
__wait_for_common+0x2fc/0x4e0 kernel/sched/completion.c:121
io_wq_exit_workers io_uring/io-wq.c:1328 [inline]
io_wq_put_and_exit+0x271/0x8a0 io_uring/io-wq.c:1356
io_uring_clean_tctx+0x10d/0x190 io_uring/tctx.c:203
io_uring_cancel_generic+0x69c/0x9a0 io_uring/cancel.c:651
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:19 [inline]
do_exit+0x2ce/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:911
do_group_exit+0xd3/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1112
get_signal+0x2671/0x26d0 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8f/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:41 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x540 kernel/entry/common.c:75
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x4ee/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa02738f749
RSP: 002b:00007fa0281ae0e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00007fa0275e6098 RCX: 00007fa02738f749
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 00007fa0275e6098
RBP: 00007fa0275e6090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa0275e6128 R14: 00007fff14e4fcb0 R15: 00007fff14e4fd98
There's really nothing wrong here, outside of processing these reads
will take a LONG time. However, we can speed up the exit by checking the
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside the io_worker_handle_work() loop, as syzbot will
exit the ring after queueing up all of these reads. Then once the first
item is processed, io-wq will simply cancel the rest. That should avoid
syzbot running into this complaint again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: reset sparse-read state in osd_fault()
When a fault occurs, the connection is abandoned, reestablished, and any
pending operations are retried. The OSD client tracks the progress of a
sparse-read reply using a separate state machine, largely independent of
the messenger's state.
If a connection is lost mid-payload or the sparse-read state machine
returns an error, the sparse-read state is not reset. The OSD client
will then interpret the beginning of a new reply as the continuation of
the old one. If this makes the sparse-read machinery enter a failure
state, it may never recover, producing loops like:
libceph: [0] got 0 extents
libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
libceph: data len 142248331 != extent len 0
libceph: osd0 (1)...:6801 socket error on read
Therefore, reset the sparse-read state in osd_fault(), ensuring retries
start from a clean state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix misalignment bug in struct virtnet_info
Use the new TRAILING_OVERLAP() helper to fix a misalignment bug
along with the following warning:
drivers/net/virtio_net.c:429:46: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
This helper creates a union between a flexible-array member (FAM)
and a set of members that would otherwise follow it (in this case
`u8 rss_hash_key_data[VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];`). This
overlays the trailing members (rss_hash_key_data) onto the FAM
(hash_key_data) while keeping the FAM and the start of MEMBERS aligned.
The static_assert() ensures this alignment remains.
Notice that due to tail padding in flexible `struct
virtio_net_rss_config_trailer`, `rss_trailer.hash_key_data`
(at offset 83 in struct virtnet_info) and `rss_hash_key_data` (at
offset 84 in struct virtnet_info) are misaligned by one byte. See
below:
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer {
__le16 max_tx_vq; /* 0 2 */
__u8 hash_key_length; /* 2 1 */
__u8 hash_key_data[]; /* 3 0 */
/* size: 4, cachelines: 1, members: 3 */
/* padding: 1 */
/* last cacheline: 4 bytes */
};
struct virtnet_info {
...
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer rss_trailer; /* 80 4 */
/* XXX last struct has 1 byte of padding */
u8 rss_hash_key_data[40]; /* 84 40 */
...
/* size: 832, cachelines: 13, members: 48 */
/* sum members: 801, holes: 8, sum holes: 31 */
/* paddings: 2, sum paddings: 5 */
};
After changes, those members are correctly aligned at offset 795:
struct virtnet_info {
...
union {
struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer rss_trailer; /* 792 4 */
struct {
unsigned char __offset_to_hash_key_data[3]; /* 792 3 */
u8 rss_hash_key_data[40]; /* 795 40 */
}; /* 792 43 */
}; /* 792 44 */
...
/* size: 840, cachelines: 14, members: 47 */
/* sum members: 801, holes: 8, sum holes: 35 */
/* padding: 4 */
/* paddings: 1, sum paddings: 4 */
/* last cacheline: 8 bytes */
};
As a result, the RSS key passed to the device is shifted by 1
byte: the last byte is cut off, and instead a (possibly
uninitialized) byte is added at the beginning.
As a last note `struct virtio_net_rss_config_hdr *rss_hdr;` is also
moved to the end, since it seems those three members should stick
around together. :) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mISDN: annotate data-race around dev->work
dev->work can re read locklessly in mISDN_read()
and mISDN_poll(). Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in mISDN_ioctl / mISDN_read
write to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10864 on cpu 1:
misdn_add_timer drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:175 [inline]
mISDN_ioctl+0x2fb/0x550 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:233
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xce/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:583
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x14b0/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88812d848280 of 4 bytes by task 10857 on cpu 0:
mISDN_read+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:112
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:847 [inline]
vfs_readv+0x3fb/0x690 fs/read_write.c:1020
do_readv+0xe7/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1080
__do_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1165 [inline]
__se_sys_readv fs/read_write.c:1162 [inline]
__x64_sys_readv+0x45/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1162
x64_sys_call+0x2831/0x3000 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:20
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: debugfs: initialize src_node and dst_node to empty strings
The debugfs_create_str() API assumes that the string pointer is either NULL
or points to valid kmalloc() memory. Leaving the pointer uninitialized can
cause problems.
Initialize src_node and dst_node to empty strings before creating the
debugfs entries to guarantee that reads and writes are safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix refcount warning on event->mmap_count increment
When calling refcount_inc(&event->mmap_count) inside perf_mmap_rb(), the
following warning is triggered:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25
PoC:
struct perf_event_attr attr = {0};
int fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0);
mmap(NULL, 0x3000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
int victim = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, fd,
PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT);
mmap(NULL, 0x3000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, victim, 0);
This occurs when creating a group member event with the flag
PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT. The group leader should be mmap-ed and then mmap-ing
the event triggers the warning.
Since the event has copied the output_event in perf_event_set_output(),
event->rb is set. As a result, perf_mmap_rb() calls
refcount_inc(&event->mmap_count) when event->mmap_count = 0.
Disallow the case when event->mmap_count = 0. This also prevents two
events from updating the same user_page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: virtuser: fix UAF in configfs release path
The gpio-virtuser configfs release path uses guard(mutex) to protect
the device structure. However, the device is freed before the guard
cleanup runs, causing mutex_unlock() to operate on freed memory.
Specifically, gpio_virtuser_device_config_group_release() destroys
the mutex and frees the device while still inside the guard(mutex)
scope. When the function returns, the guard cleanup invokes
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock), resulting in a slab use-after-free.
Limit the mutex lifetime by using a scoped_guard() only around the
activation check, so that the lock is released before mutex_destroy()
and kfree() are called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: Fix not set tty->port race condition
Revert commit bfc467db60b7 ("serial: remove redundant
tty_port_link_device()") because the tty_port_link_device() is not
redundant: the tty->port has to be confured before we call
uart_configure_port(), otherwise user-space can open console without TTY
linked to the driver.
This tty_port_link_device() was added explicitly to avoid this exact
issue in commit fb2b90014d78 ("tty: link tty and port before configuring
it as console"), so offending commit basically reverted the fix saying
it is redundant without addressing the actual race condition presented
there.
Reproducible always as tty->port warning on Qualcomm SoC with most of
devices disabled, so with very fast boot, and one serial device being
the console:
printk: legacy console [ttyMSM0] enabled
printk: legacy console [ttyMSM0] enabled
printk: legacy bootconsole [qcom_geni0] disabled
printk: legacy bootconsole [qcom_geni0] disabled
------------[ cut here ]------------
tty_init_dev: ttyMSM driver does not set tty->port. This would crash the kernel. Fix the driver!
WARNING: drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1414 at tty_init_dev.part.0+0x228/0x25c, CPU#2: systemd/1
Modules linked in: socinfo tcsrcc_eliza gcc_eliza sm3_ce fuse ipv6
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc4-next-20260108-00024-g2202f4d30aa8 #73 PREEMPT
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Eliza (DT)
...
tty_init_dev.part.0 (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1414 (discriminator 11)) (P)
tty_open (arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic_ll_sc.h:95 (discriminator 3) drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2073 (discriminator 3) drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2120 (discriminator 3))
chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:411)
do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:962)
vfs_open (fs/open.c:1094)
do_open (fs/namei.c:4634)
path_openat (fs/namei.c:4793)
do_filp_open (fs/namei.c:4820)
do_sys_openat2 (fs/open.c:1391 (discriminator 3))
...
Starting Network Name Resolution...
Apparently the flow with this small Yocto-based ramdisk user-space is:
driver (qcom_geni_serial.c): user-space:
============================ ===========
qcom_geni_serial_probe()
uart_add_one_port()
serial_core_register_port()
serial_core_add_one_port()
uart_configure_port()
register_console()
|
| open console
| ...
| tty_init_dev()
| driver->ports[idx] is NULL
|
tty_port_register_device_attr_serdev()
tty_port_link_device() <- set driver->ports[idx] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: avoid one data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work()
We should read sk->sk_socket only when dealing with kernel sockets.
syzbot reported the following data-race:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in l2tp_tunnel_del_work / sk_common_release
write to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 5365 on cpu 0:
sk_set_socket include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
sock_orphan include/net/sock.h:2118 [inline]
sk_common_release+0xae/0x230 net/core/sock.c:4003
udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20 include/net/udp.h:325
inet_release+0xce/0xf0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437
__sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
sock_close+0x6b/0x150 net/socket.c:1455
__fput+0x29b/0x650 fs/file_table.c:468
____fput+0x1c/0x30 fs/file_table.c:496
task_work_run+0x131/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:233
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:44 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1fe/0x740 kernel/entry/common.c:75
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:159 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:194 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x1e1/0x2b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff88811c182b20 of 8 bytes by task 827 on cpu 1:
l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2f/0x1a0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1418
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x4ce/0x9d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x582/0x770 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x489/0x510 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x149/0x290 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
value changed: 0xffff88811b818000 -> 0x0000000000000000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: sched: Fix perf crash with new is_user_task() helper
In order to do a user space stacktrace the current task needs to be a user
task that has executed in user space. It use to be possible to test if a
task is a user task or not by simply checking the task_struct mm field. If
it was non NULL, it was a user task and if not it was a kernel task.
But things have changed over time, and some kernel tasks now have their
own mm field.
An idea was made to instead test PF_KTHREAD and two functions were used to
wrap this check in case it became more complex to test if a task was a
user task or not[1]. But this was rejected and the C code simply checked
the PF_KTHREAD directly.
It was later found that not all kernel threads set PF_KTHREAD. The io-uring
helpers instead set PF_USER_WORKER and this needed to be added as well.
But checking the flags is still not enough. There's a very small window
when a task exits that it frees its mm field and it is set back to NULL.
If perf were to trigger at this moment, the flags test would say its a
user space task but when perf would read the mm field it would crash with
at NULL pointer dereference.
Now there are flags that can be used to test if a task is exiting, but
they are set in areas that perf may still want to profile the user space
task (to see where it exited). The only real test is to check both the
flags and the mm field.
Instead of making this modification in every location, create a new
is_user_task() helper function that does all the tests needed to know if
it is safe to read the user space memory or not.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250425204120.639530125@goodmis.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imx/tve: fix probe device leak
Make sure to drop the reference taken to the DDC device during probe on
probe failure (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix early read unlock of page with EOF in middle
The read result collection for buffered reads seems to run ahead of the
completion of subrequests under some circumstances, as can be seen in the
following log snippet:
9p_client_res: client 18446612686390831168 response P9_TREAD tag 0 err 0
...
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[1] DOWN TERM f=192 s=0 5fb2/5fb2 s=5 e=0
...
netfs_collect_folio: R=00001b55 ix=00004 r=4000-5000 t=4000/5fb2
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00004-00004 read-done
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00004-00004 read-unlock
netfs_collect_folio: R=00001b55 ix=00005 r=5000-5fb2 t=5000/5fb2
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00005-00005 read-done
netfs_folio: i=157f3 ix=00005-00005 read-unlock
...
netfs_collect_stream: R=00001b55[0:] cto=5fb2 frn=ffffffff
netfs_collect_state: R=00001b55 col=5fb2 cln=6000 n=c
netfs_collect_stream: R=00001b55[0:] cto=5fb2 frn=ffffffff
netfs_collect_state: R=00001b55 col=5fb2 cln=6000 n=8
...
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[2] ZERO SUBMT f=000 s=5fb2 0/4e s=0 e=0
netfs_sreq: R=00001b55[2] ZERO TERM f=102 s=5fb2 4e/4e s=5 e=0
The 'cto=5fb2' indicates the collected file pos we've collected results to
so far - but we still have 0x4e more bytes to go - so we shouldn't have
collected folio ix=00005 yet. The 'ZERO' subreq that clears the tail
happens after we unlock the folio, allowing the application to see the
uncleared tail through mmap.
The problem is that netfs_read_unlock_folios() will unlock a folio in which
the amount of read results collected hits EOF position - but the ZERO
subreq lies beyond that and so happens after.
Fix this by changing the end check to always be the end of the folio and
never the end of the file.
In the future, I should look at clearing to the end of the folio here rather
than adding a ZERO subreq to do this. On the other hand, the ZERO subreq can
run in parallel with an async READ subreq. Further, the ZERO subreq may still
be necessary to, say, handle extents in a ceph file that don't have any
backing store and are thus implicitly all zeros.
This can be reproduced by creating a file, the size of which doesn't align
to a page boundary, e.g. 24998 (0x5fb2) bytes and then doing something
like:
xfs_io -c "mmap -r 0 0x6000" -c "madvise -d 0 0x6000" \
-c "mread -v 0 0x6000" /xfstest.test/x
The last 0x4e bytes should all be 00, but if the tail hasn't been cleared
yet, you may see rubbish there. This can be reproduced with kafs by
modifying the kernel to disable the call to netfs_read_subreq_progress()
and to stop afs_issue_read() from doing the async call for NETFS_READAHEAD.
Reproduction can be made easier by inserting an mdelay(100) in
netfs_issue_read() for the ZERO-subreq case.
AFS and CIFS are normally unlikely to show this as they dispatch READ ops
asynchronously, which allows the ZERO-subreq to finish first. 9P's READ op is
completely synchronous, so the ZERO-subreq will always happen after. It isn't
seen all the time, though, because the collection may be done in a worker
thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Fix SVE writes on !SME systems
When SVE is supported but SME is not supported, a ptrace write to the
NT_ARM_SVE regset can place the tracee into an invalid state where
(non-streaming) SVE register data is stored in FP_STATE_SVE format but
TIF_SVE is clear. This can result in a later warning from
fpsimd_restore_current_state(), e.g.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7214 at arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c:383 fpsimd_restore_current_state+0x50c/0x748
When this happens, fpsimd_restore_current_state() will set TIF_SVE,
placing the task into the correct state. This occurs before any other
check of TIF_SVE can possibly occur, as other checks of TIF_SVE only
happen while the FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live. Thus, aside from the
warning, there is no functional issue.
This bug was introduced during rework to error handling in commit:
9f8bf718f2923 ("arm64/fpsimd: ptrace: Gracefully handle errors")
... where the setting of TIF_SVE was moved into a block which is only
executed when system_supports_sme() is true.
Fix this by removing the system_supports_sme() check. This ensures that
TIF_SVE is set for (SVE-formatted) writes to NT_ARM_SVE, at the cost of
unconditionally manipulating the tracee's saved svcr value. The
manipulation of svcr is benign and inexpensive, and we already do
similar elsewhere (e.g. during signal handling), so I don't think it's
worth guarding this with system_supports_sme() checks.
Aside from the above, there is no functional change. The 'type' argument
to sve_set_common() is only set to ARM64_VEC_SME (in ssve_set())) when
system_supports_sme(), so the ARM64_VEC_SME case in the switch statement
is still unreachable when !system_supports_sme(). When
CONFIG_ARM64_SME=n, the only caller of sve_set_common() is sve_set(),
and the compiler can constant-fold for the case where type is
ARM64_VEC_SVE, removing the logic for other cases. |
