| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| NovumOS is a custom 32-bit operating system written in Zig and x86 Assembly. In versions prior to 0.24, Syscall 12 (JumpToUser) accepts an arbitrary entry point address from user-space registers without validation, allowing any Ring 3 user-mode process to jump to kernel addresses and execute arbitrary code in Ring 0 context, resulting in local privilege escalation. This issue has been fixed in version 0.24. If developers are unable to immediately update, they should restrict syscall access by running the system in single-user mode without Ring 3, and disable user-mode processes by only running kernel shell with no user processes. This issue has been fixed in version 0.24. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: avoid OGM aggregation when skb tailroom is insufficient
When OGM aggregation state is toggled at runtime, an existing forwarded
packet may have been allocated with only packet_len bytes, while a later
packet can still be selected for aggregation. Appending in this case can
hit skb_put overflow conditions.
Reject aggregation when the target skb tailroom cannot accommodate the new
packet. The caller then falls back to creating a new forward packet
instead of appending. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: br_nd_send: linearize skb before parsing ND options
br_nd_send() parses neighbour discovery options from ns->opt[] and
assumes that these options are in the linear part of request.
Its callers only guarantee that the ICMPv6 header and target address
are available, so the option area can still be non-linear. Parsing
ns->opt[] in that case can access data past the linear buffer.
Linearize request before option parsing and derive ns from the linear
network header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: flowlabel: defer exclusive option free until RCU teardown
`ip6fl_seq_show()` walks the global flowlabel hash under the seq-file
RCU read-side lock and prints `fl->opt->opt_nflen` when an option block
is present.
Exclusive flowlabels currently free `fl->opt` as soon as `fl->users`
drops to zero in `fl_release()`. However, the surrounding
`struct ip6_flowlabel` remains visible in the global hash table until
later garbage collection removes it and `fl_free_rcu()` finally tears it
down.
A concurrent `/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel` reader can therefore race that
early `kfree()` and dereference freed option state, triggering a crash
in `ip6fl_seq_show()`.
Fix this by keeping `fl->opt` alive until `fl_free_rcu()`. That matches
the lifetime already required for the enclosing flowlabel while readers
can still reach it under RCU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: defer tunnel netdev_put to RCU release
ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy() may run after NETDEV_UNREGISTER already
detached the device. Dropping the netdev reference in destroy can race
with concurrent readers that still observe vport->dev.
Do not release vport->dev in ovs_netdev_tunnel_destroy(). Instead, let
vport_netdev_free() drop the reference from the RCU callback, matching
the non-tunnel destroy path and avoiding additional synchronization
under RTNL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_netem: fix out-of-bounds access in packet corruption
In netem_enqueue(), the packet corruption logic uses
get_random_u32_below(skb_headlen(skb)) to select an index for
modifying skb->data. When an AF_PACKET TX_RING sends fully non-linear
packets over an IPIP tunnel, skb_headlen(skb) evaluates to 0.
Passing 0 to get_random_u32_below() takes the variable-ceil slow path
which returns an unconstrained 32-bit random integer. Using this
unconstrained value as an offset into skb->data results in an
out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix this by verifying skb_headlen(skb) is non-zero before attempting
to corrupt the linear data area. Fully non-linear packets will silently
bypass the corruption logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: reject oversized addrnr in rt_mt6_check()
Reject rt match rules whose addrnr exceeds IP6T_RT_HOPS.
rt_mt6() expects addrnr to stay within the bounds of rtinfo->addrs[].
Validate addrnr during rule installation so malformed rules are rejected
before the match logic can use an out-of-range value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message()
returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink
parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server.
symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p <
end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset
0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7
bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching
context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from
p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits.
smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name
using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from
iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) +
sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when
ErrorContextCount == 0.
With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper,
and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 +
ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the
substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes
are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via
readlink(2).
Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header
to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the
substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather
than a fixed offset.
Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not
overflow here with the new greater-than. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid double-free in smbd_free_send_io() after smbd_send_batch_flush()
smbd_send_batch_flush() already calls smbd_free_send_io(),
so we should not call it again after smbd_post_send()
moved it to the batch list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: avoid double-free in smb_direct_free_sendmsg after smb_direct_flush_send_list()
smb_direct_flush_send_list() already calls smb_direct_free_sendmsg(),
so we should not call it again after post_sendmsg()
moved it to the batch list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mm: Handle invalid large leaf mappings correctly
It has been possible for a long time to mark ptes in the linear map as
invalid. This is done for secretmem, kfence, realm dma memory un/share,
and others, by simply clearing the PTE_VALID bit. But until commit
a166563e7ec37 ("arm64: mm: support large block mapping when
rodata=full") large leaf mappings were never made invalid in this way.
It turns out various parts of the code base are not equipped to handle
invalid large leaf mappings (in the way they are currently encoded) and
I've observed a kernel panic while booting a realm guest on a
BBML2_NOABORT system as a result:
[ 15.432706] software IO TLB: Memory encryption is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers
[ 15.476896] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000019600000
[ 15.513762] Mem abort info:
[ 15.527245] ESR = 0x0000000096000046
[ 15.548553] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 15.572146] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 15.592141] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 15.612694] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
[ 15.640644] Data abort info:
[ 15.661983] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000046, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 15.694875] CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 15.723740] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 15.755776] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081f3f000
[ 15.800410] [ffff000019600000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000009ffff403, pud=180000009fffe403, pmd=00e8000199600704
[ 15.855046] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000046 [#1] SMP
[ 15.886394] Modules linked in:
[ 15.900029] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-dirty #4 PREEMPT
[ 15.935258] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 15.955612] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 15.986009] pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x128/0x22c
[ 16.006163] lr : swiotlb_bounce+0xf4/0x158
[ 16.024145] sp : ffff80008000b8f0
[ 16.038896] x29: ffff80008000b8f0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 16.069953] x26: ffffb3976d261ba8 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff000019600000
[ 16.100876] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff0000043430d0 x21: 0000000000007ff0
[ 16.131946] x20: 0000000084570010 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff00001ffe3fcc
[ 16.163073] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 00000000003fffff x15: 646e612065766974
[ 16.194131] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 16.225059] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000010 x9 : 0000000000000018
[ 16.256113] x8 : 0000000000000018 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 16.287203] x5 : ffff000019607ff0 x4 : ffff000004578000 x3 : ffff000019600000
[ 16.318145] x2 : 0000000000007ff0 x1 : ffff000004570010 x0 : ffff000019600000
[ 16.349071] Call trace:
[ 16.360143] __pi_memcpy_generic+0x128/0x22c (P)
[ 16.380310] swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x154/0x2b4
[ 16.400282] swiotlb_map+0x5c/0x228
[ 16.415984] dma_map_phys+0x244/0x2b8
[ 16.432199] dma_map_page_attrs+0x44/0x58
[ 16.449782] virtqueue_map_page_attrs+0x38/0x44
[ 16.469596] virtqueue_map_single_attrs+0xc0/0x130
[ 16.490509] virtnet_rq_alloc.isra.0+0xa4/0x1fc
[ 16.510355] try_fill_recv+0x2a4/0x584
[ 16.526989] virtnet_open+0xd4/0x238
[ 16.542775] __dev_open+0x110/0x24c
[ 16.558280] __dev_change_flags+0x194/0x20c
[ 16.576879] netif_change_flags+0x24/0x6c
[ 16.594489] dev_change_flags+0x48/0x7c
[ 16.611462] ip_auto_config+0x258/0x1114
[ 16.628727] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
[ 16.645590] kernel_init_freeable+0x208/0x2f0
[ 16.664917] kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0
[ 16.680295] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 16.696369] Code: 927cec03 cb0e0021 8b0e0042 a9411c26 (a900340c)
[ 16.723106] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 16.752866] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
[ 16.792556] Kernel Offset: 0x3396ea200000 from 0xffff8000800000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: smbdirect: introduce smbdirect_socket.recv_io.credits.available
The logic off managing recv credits by counting posted recv_io and
granted credits is racy.
That's because the peer might already consumed a credit,
but between receiving the incoming recv at the hardware
and processing the completion in the 'recv_done' functions
we likely have a window where we grant credits, which
don't really exist.
So we better have a decicated counter for the
available credits, which will be incremented
when we posted new recv buffers and drained when
we grant the credits to the peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: let send_done handle a completion without IB_SEND_SIGNALED
With smbdirect_send_batch processing we likely have requests without
IB_SEND_SIGNALED, which will be destroyed in the final request
that has IB_SEND_SIGNALED set.
If the connection is broken all requests are signaled
even without explicit IB_SEND_SIGNALED. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx->pmu for groups
Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access
when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back.
This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when
the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU
are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in()
using pmu_ctx->pmu.
Turns out, inherit uses event->pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the
move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use
pmu_ctx->pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context.
Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx->pmu for the
group case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown
A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item
policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue.
The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing
struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down
before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have
been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory.
xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown,
but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work.
Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the
queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a
freed struct net. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_ecred_conn_req
Syzbot reported a KASAN stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_build_cmd()
that is triggered by a malformed Enhanced Credit Based Connection Request.
The vulnerability stems from l2cap_ecred_conn_req(). The function allocates
a local stack buffer (`pdu`) designed to hold a maximum of 5 Source Channel
IDs (SCIDs), totaling 18 bytes. When an attacker sends a request with more
than 5 SCIDs, the function calculates `rsp_len` based on this unvalidated
`cmd_len` before checking if the number of SCIDs exceeds
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID.
If the SCID count is too high, the function correctly jumps to the
`response` label to reject the packet, but `rsp_len` retains the
attacker's oversized value. Consequently, l2cap_send_cmd() is instructed
to read past the end of the 18-byte `pdu` buffer, triggering a
KASAN panic.
Fix this by moving the assignment of `rsp_len` to after the `num_scid`
boundary check. If the packet is rejected, `rsp_len` will safely
remain 0, and the error response will only read the 8-byte base header
from the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete
This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix double-free of smc_spd_priv when tee() duplicates splice pipe buffer
smc_rx_splice() allocates one smc_spd_priv per pipe_buffer and stores
the pointer in pipe_buffer.private. The pipe_buf_operations for these
buffers used .get = generic_pipe_buf_get, which only increments the page
reference count when tee(2) duplicates a pipe buffer. The smc_spd_priv
pointer itself was not handled, so after tee() both the original and the
cloned pipe_buffer share the same smc_spd_priv *.
When both pipes are subsequently released, smc_rx_pipe_buf_release() is
called twice against the same object:
1st call: kfree(priv) sock_put(sk) smc_rx_update_cons() [correct]
2nd call: kfree(priv) sock_put(sk) smc_rx_update_cons() [UAF]
KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release(), which
then escalates to a NULL-pointer dereference and kernel panic via
smc_rx_update_consumer() when it chases the freed priv->smc pointer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x78/0x2a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004a45740 by task smc_splice_tee_/74
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xce/0x650
kasan_report+0xc6/0x100
smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x78/0x2a0
free_pipe_info+0xd4/0x130
pipe_release+0x142/0x160
__fput+0x1c6/0x490
__x64_sys_close+0x4f/0x90
do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
RIP: 0010:smc_rx_update_consumer+0x8d/0x350
Call Trace:
<TASK>
smc_rx_pipe_buf_release+0x121/0x2a0
free_pipe_info+0xd4/0x130
pipe_release+0x142/0x160
__fput+0x1c6/0x490
__x64_sys_close+0x4f/0x90
do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Beyond the memory-safety problem, duplicating an SMC splice buffer is
semantically questionable: smc_rx_update_cons() would advance the
consumer cursor twice for the same data, corrupting receive-window
accounting. A refcount on smc_spd_priv could fix the double-free, but
the cursor-accounting issue would still need to be addressed separately.
The .get callback is invoked by both tee(2) and splice_pipe_to_pipe()
for partial transfers; both will now return -EFAULT. Users who need
to duplicate SMC socket data must use a copy-based read path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iavf: fix out-of-bounds writes in iavf_get_ethtool_stats()
iavf incorrectly uses real_num_tx_queues for ETH_SS_STATS. Since the
value could change in runtime, we should use num_tx_queues instead.
Moreover iavf_get_ethtool_stats() uses num_active_queues while
iavf_get_sset_count() and iavf_get_stat_strings() use
real_num_tx_queues, which triggers out-of-bounds writes when we do
"ethtool -L" and "ethtool -S" simultaneously [1].
For example when we change channels from 1 to 8, Thread 3 could be
scheduled before Thread 2, and out-of-bounds writes could be triggered
in Thread 3:
Thread 1 (ethtool -L) Thread 2 (work) Thread 3 (ethtool -S)
iavf_set_channels()
...
iavf_alloc_queues()
-> num_active_queues = 8
iavf_schedule_finish_config()
iavf_get_sset_count()
real_num_tx_queues: 1
-> buffer for 1 queue
iavf_get_ethtool_stats()
num_active_queues: 8
-> out-of-bounds!
iavf_finish_config()
-> real_num_tx_queues = 8
Use immutable num_tx_queues in all related functions to avoid the issue.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
Write of size 8 at addr ffffc900031c9080 by task ethtool/5800
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5800 Comm: ethtool Not tainted 6.19.0-enjuk-08403-g8137e3db7f1c #241 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
print_report+0x170/0x4f3
kasan_report+0xe1/0x180
iavf_add_one_ethtool_stat+0x200/0x270
iavf_get_ethtool_stats+0x14c/0x2e0
__dev_ethtool+0x3d0c/0x5830
dev_ethtool+0x12d/0x270
dev_ioctl+0x53c/0xe30
sock_do_ioctl+0x1a9/0x270
sock_ioctl+0x3d4/0x5e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x690
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7da0e6e36d
...
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to a 1-page vmalloc region starting at 0xffffc900031c9000 allocated at __dev_ethtool+0x3cc9/0x5830
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0xffff88813a013de0 pfn:0x13a013
flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
raw: 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: ffff88813a013de0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffc900031c8f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
ffffc900031c9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffc900031c9080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
^
ffffc900031c9100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
ffffc900031c9180: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 |
