| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion
Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu()
rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading
/proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's
been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix
this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that
are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means
there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list
here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from
the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan966x: fix page_pool error handling in lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc_page_pool()
page_pool_create() can return an ERR_PTR on failure. The return value
is used unconditionally in the loop that follows, passing the error
pointer through xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() into page_pool_use_xdp_mem(),
which dereferences it, causing a kernel oops.
Add an IS_ERR check after page_pool_create() to return early on failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix PREEMPT_RT raw/bh spinlock nesting for async VC handling
Switch from using the completion's raw spinlock to a local lock in the
idpf_vc_xn struct. The conversion is safe because complete/_all() are
called outside the lock and there is no reason to share the completion
lock in the current logic. This avoids invalid wait context reported by
the kernel due to the async handler taking BH spinlock:
[ 805.726977] =============================
[ 805.726991] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 805.727006] 7.0.0-rc2-net-devq-031026+ #28 Tainted: G S OE
[ 805.727026] -----------------------------
[ 805.727038] kworker/u261:0/572 is trying to lock:
[ 805.727051] ff190da6a8dbb6a0 (&vport_config->mac_filter_list_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727099] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 805.727111] context-{5:5}
[ 805.727119] 3 locks held by kworker/u261:0/572:
[ 805.727132] #0: ff190da6db3e6148 ((wq_completion)idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4b5/0x730
[ 805.727163] #1: ff3c6f0a6131fe50 ((work_completion)(&(&adapter->mbx_task)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e5/0x730
[ 805.727191] #2: ff190da765190020 (&x->wait#34){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: idpf_recv_mb_msg+0xc8/0x710 [idpf]
[ 805.727218] stack backtrace:
...
[ 805.727238] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx idpf_mbx_task [idpf]
[ 805.727247] Call Trace:
[ 805.727249] <TASK>
[ 805.727251] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 805.727259] __lock_acquire+0xb3b/0x2290
[ 805.727268] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x59/0x130
[ 805.727275] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2f0
[ 805.727277] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727284] ? _printk+0x5b/0x80
[ 805.727290] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50
[ 805.727298] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727303] idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727310] idpf_recv_mb_msg+0x1c8/0x710 [idpf]
[ 805.727317] process_one_work+0x226/0x730
[ 805.727322] worker_thread+0x19e/0x340
[ 805.727325] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727328] kthread+0xf4/0x130
[ 805.727333] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727336] ret_from_fork+0x32c/0x410
[ 805.727345] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727347] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 805.727354] </TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is
BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit()
decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including
page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a
large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the
subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value
(~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute
hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i
pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less
SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel
memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and
potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to
min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then
always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single
descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally,
and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect
The vub300 driver maintains an explicit reference count for the
controller and its driver data and the last reference can in theory be
dropped after the driver has been unbound.
This specifically means that the controller allocation must not be
device managed as that can lead to use-after-free.
Note that the lifetime is currently also incorrectly tied the parent USB
device rather than interface, which can lead to memory leaks if the
driver is unbound without its device being physically disconnected (e.g.
on probe deferral).
Fix both issues by reverting to non-managed allocation of the controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/stat: deallocate damon_call() failure leaking damon_ctx
damon_stat_start() always allocates the module's damon_ctx object
(damon_stat_context). Meanwhile, if damon_call() in the function fails,
the damon_ctx object is not deallocated. Hence, if the damon_call() is
failed, and the user writes Y to “enabled” again, the previously
allocated damon_ctx object is leaked.
This cannot simply be fixed by deallocating the damon_ctx object when
damon_call() fails. That's because damon_call() failure doesn't guarantee
the kdamond main function, which accesses the damon_ctx object, is
completely finished. In other words, if damon_stat_start() deallocates
the damon_ctx object after damon_call() failure, the not-yet-terminated
kdamond could access the freed memory (use-after-free).
Fix the leak while avoiding the use-after-free by keeping returning
damon_stat_start() without deallocating the damon_ctx object after
damon_call() failure, but deallocating it when the function is invoked
again and the kdamond is completely terminated. If the kdamond is not yet
terminated, simply return -EAGAIN, as the kdamond will soon be terminated.
The issue was discovered [1] by sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: dealloc repeat_call_control if damon_call() fails
damon_call() for repeat_call_control of DAMON_SYSFS could fail if somehow
the kdamond is stopped before the damon_call(). It could happen, for
example, when te damon context was made for monitroing of a virtual
address processes, and the process is terminated immediately, before the
damon_call() invocation. In the case, the dyanmically allocated
repeat_call_control is not deallocated and leaked.
Fix the leak by deallocating the repeat_call_control under the
damon_call() failure.
This issue is discovered by sashiko [1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vma: fix memory leak in __mmap_region()
commit 605f6586ecf7 ("mm/vma: do not leak memory when .mmap_prepare
swaps the file") handled the success path by skipping get_file() via
file_doesnt_need_get, but missed the error path.
When /dev/zero is mmap'd with MAP_SHARED, mmap_zero_prepare() calls
shmem_zero_setup_desc() which allocates a new shmem file to back the
mapping. If __mmap_new_vma() subsequently fails, this replacement
file is never fput()'d - the original is released by
ksys_mmap_pgoff(), but nobody releases the new one.
Add fput() for the swapped file in the error path.
Reproducible with fault injection.
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 366 Comm: syz.7.14 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x164/0x1f0
should_fail_ex+0x525/0x650
should_failslab+0xdf/0x140
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x78/0x630
vm_area_alloc+0x24/0x160
__mmap_region+0xf6b/0x2660
mmap_region+0x2eb/0x3a0
do_mmap+0xc79/0x1240
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x252/0x4c0
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xf8/0x120
__x64_sys_mmap+0x12a/0x190
do_syscall_64+0xa9/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
kmemleak: 1 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881118aca80 (size 360):
comm "syz.7.14", pid 366, jiffies 4294913255
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c0 28 4d ae ff ff ff ff .........(M.....
backtrace (crc db0f53bc):
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3ab/0x630
alloc_empty_file+0x5a/0x1e0
alloc_file_pseudo+0x135/0x220
__shmem_file_setup+0x274/0x420
shmem_zero_setup_desc+0x9c/0x170
mmap_zero_prepare+0x123/0x140
__mmap_region+0xdda/0x2660
mmap_region+0x2eb/0x3a0
do_mmap+0xc79/0x1240
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x252/0x4c0
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xf8/0x120
__x64_sys_mmap+0x12a/0x190
do_syscall_64+0xa9/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Found by syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat
worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same
engine->heartbeat.systole request.
The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls
i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears
the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request
retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering
__engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat
timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and
intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer
and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:
```
<4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915]
<4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0
...
<4> [487.222707] Call Trace:
<4> [487.222711] <TASK>
<4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915]
<4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
<4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915]
<4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915]
<4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915]
<4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760
<4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
<4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150
<4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480
<4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
<4> [487.227141] </TASK>
```
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with
xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware
instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This
guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL
pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.
(cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a
global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator
advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN
header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc().
The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when
it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object
before the later packet-size check runs.
Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in
the 16-bit TVLV payload length field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size
dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.
Change the free size to match the allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG
The GRP_ACK_MSG handler in tipc_group_proto_rcv() currently decrements
bc_ackers on every inbound group ACK, even when the same member has
already acknowledged the current broadcast round.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, a duplicate ACK received after the last
legitimate ACK wraps the counter to 65535. Once wrapped,
tipc_group_bc_cong() keeps reporting congestion and later group
broadcasts on the affected socket stay blocked until the group is
recreated.
Fix this by ignoring duplicate or stale ACKs before touching bc_acked or
bc_ackers. This makes repeated GRP_ACK_MSG handling idempotent and
prevents the underflow path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put()
immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish.
The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn,
which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead
drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish,
using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb.
This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip
the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary
async return points, release the reference inline when
async is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core
A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered
reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for
example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5
controller):
ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex
The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:
1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls
uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() ->
uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex.
2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls
uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires
input_mutex.
3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and
calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires
dev->mutex.
4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under
dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex.
Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect
udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of
acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check
device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via
uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock
(ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This
breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in
the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.
To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect
writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and
uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.
Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from
uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before
uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated,
uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from
the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the
request becomes visible.
Lock ordering after the fix:
ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel
The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established
The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on
SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability
during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and
tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag
via proto_register().
However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into
tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5),
before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has
called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point,
tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab
remains NULL permanently.
This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via
kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab
cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so
when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is
cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be
immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under
rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a
slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established.
Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of
mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called
from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This
ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the
SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Fix the descriptor address in __kvm_at_swap_desc()
Using "(u64 __user *)hva + offset" to get the virtual addresses of S1/S2
descriptors looks really wrong, if offset is not zero. What we want to get
for swapping is hva + offset, not hva + offset*8. ;-)
Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix deadlock during netdev reset with active connections
Resolve deadlock that occurs when user executes netdev reset while RDMA
applications (e.g., rping) are active. The netdev reset causes ice
driver to remove irdma auxiliary driver, triggering device_delete and
subsequent client removal. During client removal, uverbs_client waits
for QP reference count to reach zero while cma_client holds the final
reference, creating circular dependency and indefinite wait in iWARP
mode. Skip QP reference count wait during device reset to prevent
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Handle the case that EIOINTC's coremap is empty
EIOINTC's coremap in eiointc_update_sw_coremap() can be empty, currently
we get a cpuid with -1 in this case, but we actually need 0 because it's
similar as the case that cpuid >= 4.
This fix an out-of-bounds access to kvm_arch::phyid_map::phys_map[]. |
