| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Increase ASB control timeout
The bcm2835_asb_control() function uses a tight polling loop to wait
for the ASB bridge to acknowledge a request. During intensive workloads,
this handshake intermittently fails for V3D's master ASB on BCM2711,
resulting in "Failed to disable ASB master for v3d" errors during
runtime PM suspend. As a consequence, the failed power-off leaves V3D in
a broken state, leading to bus faults or system hangs on later accesses.
As the timeout is insufficient in some scenarios, increase the polling
timeout from 1us to 5us, which is still negligible in the context of a
power domain transition. Also, replace the open-coded ktime_get_ns()/
cpu_relax() polling loop with readl_poll_timeout_atomic(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wlcore: Return -ENOMEM instead of -EAGAIN if there is not enough headroom
Since upstream commit e75665dd0968 ("wifi: wlcore: ensure skb headroom
before skb_push"), wl1271_tx_allocate() and with it
wl1271_prepare_tx_frame() returns -EAGAIN if pskb_expand_head() fails.
However, in wlcore_tx_work_locked(), a return value of -EAGAIN from
wl1271_prepare_tx_frame() is interpreted as the aggregation buffer being
full. This causes the code to flush the buffer, put the skb back at the
head of the queue, and immediately retry the same skb in a tight while
loop.
Because wlcore_tx_work_locked() holds wl->mutex, and the retry happens
immediately with GFP_ATOMIC, this will result in an infinite loop and a
CPU soft lockup. Return -ENOMEM instead so the packet is dropped and
the loop terminates.
The problem was found by an experimental code review agent based on
gemini-3.1-pro while reviewing backports into v6.18.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Require sys_futex_requeue() to have identical flags
Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:
WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524
When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.
After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
// acquires the PI futex
exit()
futex_cleanup_begin()
futex_state = EXITING;
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
attach_to_pi_owner()
// observes EXITING
*exiting = owner; // takes ref
return -EBUSY
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
put_task_struct(); // drops ref
// exiting still points to owner
goto retry;
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
lock_pi_update_atomic()
cmpxchg(uaddr)
*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
// value changed
return -EAGAIN;
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)
Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: scrub: unlock dquot before early return in quota scrub
xchk_quota_item can return early after calling xchk_fblock_process_error.
When that helper returns false, the function returned immediately without
dropping dq->q_qlock, which can leave the dquot lock held and risk lock
leaks or deadlocks in later quota operations.
Fix this by unlocking dq->q_qlock before the early return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Make kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() more robust
kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() takes a cpuid parameter whose type is int, so
cpuid can be negative. Let kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() return NULL for this
case so as to make it more robust.
This fix an out-of-bounds access to kvm_arch::phyid_map::phys_map[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/cpu: Remove X86_CR4_FRED from the CR4 pinned bits mask
Commit in Fixes added the FRED CR4 bit to the CR4 pinned bits mask so
that whenever something else modifies CR4, that bit remains set. Which
in itself is a perfectly fine idea.
However, there's an issue when during boot FRED is initialized: first on
the BSP and later on the APs. Thus, there's a window in time when
exceptions cannot be handled.
This becomes particularly nasty when running as SEV-{ES,SNP} or TDX
guests which, when they manage to trigger exceptions during that short
window described above, triple fault due to FRED MSRs not being set up
yet.
See Link tag below for a much more detailed explanation of the
situation.
So, as a result, the commit in that Link URL tried to address this
shortcoming by temporarily disabling CR4 pinning when an AP is not
online yet.
However, that is a problem in itself because in this case, an attack on
the kernel needs to only modify the online bit - a single bit in RW
memory - and then disable CR4 pinning and then disable SM*P, leading to
more and worse things to happen to the system.
So, instead, remove the FRED bit from the CR4 pinning mask, thus
obviating the need to temporarily disable CR4 pinning.
If someone manages to disable FRED when poking at CR4, then
idt_invalidate() would make sure the system would crash'n'burn on the
first exception triggered, which is a much better outcome security-wise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: dsi: Store driver data before invoking mipi_dsi_host_register
The call to mipi_dsi_host_register triggers a callback to mtk_dsi_bind,
which uses dev_get_drvdata to retrieve the mtk_dsi struct, so this
structure needs to be stored inside the driver data before invoking it.
As drvdata is currently uninitialized it leads to a crash when
registering the DSI DRM encoder right after acquiring
the mode_config.idr_mutex, blocking all subsequent DRM operations.
Fixes the following crash during mediatek-drm probe (tested on Xiaomi
Smart Clock x04g):
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
0000000000000040
[...]
Modules linked in: mediatek_drm(+) drm_display_helper cec drm_client_lib
drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper panel_simple
[...]
Call trace:
drm_mode_object_add+0x58/0x98 (P)
__drm_encoder_init+0x48/0x140
drm_encoder_init+0x6c/0xa0
drm_simple_encoder_init+0x20/0x34 [drm_kms_helper]
mtk_dsi_bind+0x34/0x13c [mediatek_drm]
component_bind_all+0x120/0x280
mtk_drm_bind+0x284/0x67c [mediatek_drm]
try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x23c/0x320
__component_add+0xa4/0x198
component_add+0x14/0x20
mtk_dsi_host_attach+0x78/0x100 [mediatek_drm]
mipi_dsi_attach+0x2c/0x50
panel_simple_dsi_probe+0x4c/0x9c [panel_simple]
mipi_dsi_drv_probe+0x1c/0x28
really_probe+0xc0/0x3dc
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0xbc/0x17c
bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xf0
__device_attach+0x9c/0x1cc
device_initial_probe+0x54/0x60
bus_probe_device+0x34/0xa0
device_add+0x5b0/0x800
mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xdc/0x16c
mipi_dsi_host_register+0xc4/0x17c
mtk_dsi_probe+0x10c/0x260 [mediatek_drm]
platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4
really_probe+0xc0/0x3dc
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x120
__driver_attach+0xc8/0x1f8
bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0
driver_attach+0x24/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x11c/0x240
driver_register+0x68/0x130
__platform_register_drivers+0x64/0x160
mtk_drm_init+0x24/0x1000 [mediatek_drm]
do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d0
do_init_module+0x54/0x240
load_module+0x1838/0x1dc0
init_module_from_file+0xd8/0xf0
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1b4/0x428
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x48/0xc8
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xb8
el0_svc+0x34/0xe8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: 52800022 941004ab 2a0003f3 37f80040 (29005a80) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix fence put before wait in amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib
amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() submits a GPU job and gets a fence
from amdgpu_ib_schedule(). This fence is used to wait for job
completion.
Currently, the code drops the fence reference using dma_fence_put()
before calling dma_fence_wait().
If dma_fence_put() releases the last reference, the fence may be
freed before dma_fence_wait() is called. This can lead to a
use-after-free.
Fix this by waiting on the fence first and releasing the reference
only after dma_fence_wait() completes.
Fixes the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c:697 amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() warn: passing freed memory 'f' (line 696)
(cherry picked from commit 8b9e5259adc385b61a6590a13b82ae0ac2bd3482) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: sleep: Drop spurious WARN_ON() from pm_restore_gfp_mask()
Commit 35e4a69b2003f ("PM: sleep: Allow pm_restrict_gfp_mask()
stacking") introduced refcount-based GFP mask management that warns
when pm_restore_gfp_mask() is called with saved_gfp_count == 0.
Some hibernation paths call pm_restore_gfp_mask() defensively where
the GFP mask may or may not be restricted depending on the execution
path. For example, the uswsusp interface invokes it in
SNAPSHOT_CREATE_IMAGE, SNAPSHOT_UNFREEZE, and snapshot_release().
Before the stacking change this was a silent no-op; it now triggers
a spurious WARNING.
Remove the WARN_ON() wrapper from the !saved_gfp_count check while
retaining the check itself, so that defensive calls remain harmless
without producing false warnings.
[ rjw: Subject tweak ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory
There are special cases where secure storage access exceptions happen
in a kernel context for pages that don't have the PG_arch_1 bit
set. That bit is set for non-exported guest secure storage (memory)
but is absent on storage donated to the Ultravisor since the kernel
isn't allowed to export donated pages.
Prior to this patch we would try to export the page by calling
arch_make_folio_accessible() which would instantly return since the
arch bit is absent signifying that the page was already exported and
no further action is necessary. This leads to secure storage access
exception loops which can never be resolved.
With this patch we unconditionally try to export and if that fails we
fixup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gw: fix OOB heap access in cgw_csum_crc8_rel()
cgw_csum_crc8_rel() correctly computes bounds-safe indices via calc_idx():
int from = calc_idx(crc8->from_idx, cf->len);
int to = calc_idx(crc8->to_idx, cf->len);
int res = calc_idx(crc8->result_idx, cf->len);
if (from < 0 || to < 0 || res < 0)
return;
However, the loop and the result write then use the raw s8 fields directly
instead of the computed variables:
for (i = crc8->from_idx; ...) /* BUG: raw negative index */
cf->data[crc8->result_idx] = ...; /* BUG: raw negative index */
With from_idx = to_idx = result_idx = -64 on a 64-byte CAN FD frame,
calc_idx(-64, 64) = 0 so the guard passes, but the loop iterates with
i = -64, reading cf->data[-64], and the write goes to cf->data[-64].
This write might end up to 56 (7.0-rc) or 40 (<= 6.19) bytes before the
start of the canfd_frame on the heap.
The companion function cgw_csum_xor_rel() uses `from`/`to`/`res`
correctly throughout; fix cgw_csum_crc8_rel() to match.
Confirmed with KASAN on linux-7.0-rc2:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cgw_csum_crc8_rel+0x515/0x5b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880076619c8 by task poc_cgw_oob/62
To configure the can-gw crc8 checksums CAP_NET_ADMIN is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Unlink NV12 planes earlier
unlink_nv12_plane() will clobber parts of the plane state
potentially already set up by plane_atomic_check(), so we
must make sure not to call the two in the wrong order.
The problem happens when a plane previously selected as
a Y plane is now configured as a normal plane by user space.
plane_atomic_check() will first compute the proper plane
state based on the userspace request, and unlink_nv12_plane()
later clears some of the state.
This used to work on account of unlink_nv12_plane() skipping
the state clearing based on the plane visibility. But I removed
that check, thinking it was an impossible situation. Now when
that situation happens unlink_nv12_plane() will just WARN
and proceed to clobber the state.
Rather than reverting to the old way of doing things, I think
it's more clear if we unlink the NV12 planes before we even
compute the new plane state.
(cherry picked from commit 017ecd04985573eeeb0745fa2c23896fb22ee0cc) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: designware: amdisp: Fix resume-probe race condition issue
Identified resume-probe race condition in kernel v7.0 with the commit
38fa29b01a6a ("i2c: designware: Combine the init functions"),but this
issue existed from the beginning though not detected.
The amdisp i2c device requires ISP to be in power-on state for probe
to succeed. To meet this requirement, this device is added to genpd
to control ISP power using runtime PM. The pm_runtime_get_sync() called
before i2c_dw_probe() triggers PM resume, which powers on ISP and also
invokes the amdisp i2c runtime resume before the probe completes resulting
in this race condition and a NULL dereferencing issue in v7.0
Fix this race condition by using the genpd APIs directly during probe:
- Call dev_pm_genpd_resume() to Power ON ISP before probe
- Call dev_pm_genpd_suspend() to Power OFF ISP after probe
- Set the device to suspended state with pm_runtime_set_suspended()
- Enable runtime PM only after the device is fully initialized |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: Fix kernel panic due to __initconst misuse
Fix a kernel panic when probing the driver as a module:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
ffffd9c18eb05000
of_find_matching_node_and_match+0x5c/0x1a0
hantro_probe+0x2f4/0x7d0 [hantro_vpu]
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources array is referenced by variant
structures through their shared_devices field. When built as a
module, __initconst causes this data to be freed after module
init, but it's later accessed during probe, causing a page fault.
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources is referenced from non-init code,
so keeping __initconst or __initconst_or_module here is wrong.
Drop the __initconst annotation and let it live in the normal .rodata
section.
A bug of __initconst called from regular non-init probe code
leading to bugs during probe deferrals or during unbind-bind cycles. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clockevents: Add missing resets of the next_event_forced flag
The prevention mechanism against timer interrupt starvation missed to reset
the next_event_forced flag in a couple of places:
- When the clock event state changes. That can cause the flag to be
stale over a shutdown/startup sequence
- When a non-forced event is armed, which then prevents rearming before
that event. If that event is far out in the future this will cause
missed timer interrupts.
- In the suspend wakeup handler.
That led to stalls which have been reported by several people.
Add the missing resets, which fixes the problems for the reporters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/userfaultfd: fix hugetlb fault mutex hash calculation
In mfill_atomic_hugetlb(), linear_page_index() is used to calculate the
page index for hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(). However, linear_page_index()
returns the index in PAGE_SIZE units, while hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash()
expects the index in huge page units. This mismatch means that different
addresses within the same huge page can produce different hash values,
leading to the use of different mutexes for the same huge page. This can
cause races between faulting threads, which can corrupt the reservation
map and trigger the BUG_ON in resv_map_release().
Fix this by introducing hugetlb_linear_page_index(), which returns the
page index in huge page granularity, and using it in place of
linear_page_index(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()
In hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
hackrf_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev
....
v4l2_device_register();
....
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open hackrf fd
....
v4l2_device_unregister();
....
kfree(); // free hackrf_dev
....
sys_ioctl(fd, ...);
v4l2_ioctl();
video_is_registered() // UAF!!
....
sys_close(fd);
v4l2_release() // UAF!!
hackrf_video_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so
new open() calls are blocked.
However, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do
not terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is
dropped and the driver's release() is invoked.
Therefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe()
has registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since
those already-open handles haven't been released yet.
And since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln occur.
To prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be
modified to free memory only through release() rather than calling
kfree() directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix NULL i_assoc_inode dereference in nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map
The DAT inode's btree node cache (i_assoc_inode) is initialized lazily
during btree operations. However, nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map()
assumes i_assoc_inode is already initialized when copying dirty pages
to the shadow map during GC.
If NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS is called immediately after mount before
any btree operation has occurred on the DAT inode, i_assoc_inode is
NULL leading to a general protection fault.
Fix this by calling nilfs_attach_btree_node_cache() on the DAT inode
in nilfs_dat_read() at mount time, ensuring i_assoc_inode is always
initialized before any GC operation can use it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe()
In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
as102_usb_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t
....
usb_register_dev();
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd
....
usb_deregister_dev();
....
kfree(); // free as102_dev_t
....
sys_close(fd);
as102_release() // UAF!!
as102_usb_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later
unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is
removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are
already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last
reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked.
In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an
error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away.
If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that
open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access
or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln.
The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev()
has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release().
In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open
FD is closed. |
