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Search Results (346532 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-31629 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: add missing return after LLCP_CLOSED checks In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock() and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to a use-after-free. Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches in both functions to prevent the fall-through. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31628 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/CPU: Fix FPDSS on Zen1 Zen1's hardware divider can leave, under certain circumstances, partial results from previous operations. Those results can be leaked by another, attacker thread. Fix that with a chicken bit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31627 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: s3c24xx: check the size of the SMBUS message before using it The first byte of an i2c SMBUS message is the size, and it should be verified to ensure that it is in the range of 0..I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX before processing it. This is the same logic that was added in commit a6e04f05ce0b ("i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read") to the i2c tegra driver. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31626 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: initialize le_tmp64 in rtw_BIP_verify() Initialize le_tmp64 to zero in rtw_BIP_verify() to prevent using uninitialized data. Smatch warns that only 6 bytes are copied to this 8-byte (u64) variable, leaving the last two bytes uninitialized: drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c:1308 rtw_BIP_verify() warn: not copying enough bytes for '&le_tmp64' (8 vs 6 bytes) Initializing the variable at the start of the function fixes this warning and ensures predictable behavior. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31625 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: alps: fix NULL pointer dereference in alps_raw_event() Commit ecfa6f34492c ("HID: Add HID_CLAIMED_INPUT guards in raw_event callbacks missing them") attempted to fix up the HID drivers that had missed the previous fix that was done in 2ff5baa9b527 ("HID: appleir: Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle"), but the alps driver was missed. Fix this up by properly checking in the hid-alps driver that it had been claimed correctly before attempting to process the raw event. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31624 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: clamp report_size in s32ton() to avoid undefined shift s32ton() shifts by n-1 where n is the field's report_size, a value that comes directly from a HID device. The HID parser bounds report_size only to <= 256, so a broken HID device can supply a report descriptor with a wide field that triggers shift exponents up to 256 on a 32-bit type when an output report is built via hid_output_field() or hid_set_field(). Commit ec61b41918587 ("HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in hid_report_raw_event") added the same n > 32 clamp to the function snto32(), but s32ton() was never given the same fix as I guess syzbot hadn't figured out how to fuzz a device the same way. Fix this up by just clamping the max value of n, just like snto32() does. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31623 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete() A malicious USB device claiming to be a CDC Phonet modem can overflow the skb_shared_info->frags[] array by sending an unbounded sequence of full-page bulk transfers. Drop the skb and increment the length error when the frag limit is reached. This matches the same fix that commit f0813bcd2d9d ("net: wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") did for the t7xx driver. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31622 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round follows). ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round. Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer. Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays") fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31621 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnge: return after auxiliary_device_uninit() in error path When auxiliary_device_add() fails, the error block calls auxiliary_device_uninit() but does not return. The uninit drops the last reference and synchronously runs bnge_aux_dev_release(), which sets bd->auxr_dev = NULL and frees the underlying object. The subsequent bd->auxr_dev->net = bd->netdev then dereferences NULL, which is not a good thing to have happen when trying to clean up from an error. Add the missing return, as the auxiliary bus documentation states is a requirement (seems that LLM tools read documentation better than humans do...) | ||||
| CVE-2026-31620 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usx2y: us144mkii: fix NULL deref on missing interface 0 A malicious USB device with the TASCAM US-144MKII device id can have a configuration containing bInterfaceNumber=1 but no interface 0. USB configuration descriptors are not required to assign interface numbers sequentially, so usb_ifnum_to_if(dev, 0) returns will NULL, which will then be dereferenced directly. Fix this up by checking the return value properly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31619 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: fireworks: bound device-supplied status before string array lookup The status field in an EFW response is a 32-bit value supplied by the firewire device. efr_status_names[] has 17 entries so a status value outside that range goes off into the weeds when looking at the %s value. Even worse, the status could return EFR_STATUS_INCOMPLETE which is 0x80000000, and is obviously not in that array of potential strings. Fix this up by properly bounding the index against the array size and printing "unknown" if it's not recognized. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31618 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: tdfxfb: avoid divide-by-zero on FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO Much like commit 19f953e74356 ("fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide by zero error"), we also need to prevent that same crash from happening in the udlfb driver as it uses pixclock directly when dividing, which will crash. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31617 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb() The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of: ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size) will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never exceed, defeating the check entirely. The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len - opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the network skb. Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined. Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed a related class of issues on the host side of NCM. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31616 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in pn_rx_complete() A broken/bored/mean USB host can overflow the skb_shared_info->frags[] array on a Linux gadget exposing a Phonet function by sending an unbounded sequence of full-page OUT transfers. pn_rx_complete() finalizes the skb only when req->actual < req->length, where req->length is set to PAGE_SIZE by the gadget. If the host always sends exactly PAGE_SIZE bytes per transfer, fp->rx.skb will never be reset and each completion will add another fragment via skb_add_rx_frag(). Once nr_frags exceeds MAX_SKB_FRAGS (default 17), subsequent frag stores overwrite memory adjacent to the shinfo on the heap. Drop the skb and account a length error when the frag limit is reached, matching the fix applied in t7xx by commit f0813bcd2d9d ("net: wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-31615 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: renesas_usb3: validate endpoint index in standard request handlers The GET_STATUS and SET/CLEAR_FEATURE handlers extract the endpoint number from the host-supplied wIndex without any sort of validation. Fix this up by validating the number of endpoints actually match up with the number the device has before attempting to dereference a pointer based on this math. This is just like what was done in commit ee0d382feb44 ("usb: gadget: aspeed_udc: validate endpoint index for ast udc") for the aspeed driver. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31614 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31613 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server. symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset 0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits. smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0. With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2). Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset. Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31612 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea() smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input buffer received. Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer. Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to the client. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31611 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: require 3 sub-authorities before reading sub_auth[2] parse_dacl() compares each ACE SID against sid_unix_NFS_mode and on match reads sid.sub_auth[2] as the file mode. If sid_unix_NFS_mode is the prefix S-1-5-88-3 with num_subauth = 2 then compare_sids() compares only min(num_subauth, 2) sub-authorities so a client SID with num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth = {88, 3} will match. If num_subauth = 2 and the ACE is placed at the very end of the security descriptor, sub_auth[2] will be 4 bytes past end_of_acl. The out-of-band bytes will then be masked to the low 9 bits and applied as the file's POSIX mode, probably not something that is good to have happen. Fix this up by forcing the SID to actually carry a third sub-authority before reading it at all. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31610 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-24 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix mechToken leak when SPNEGO decode fails after token alloc The kernel ASN.1 BER decoder calls action callbacks incrementally as it walks the input. When ksmbd_decode_negTokenInit() reaches the mechToken [2] OCTET STRING element, ksmbd_neg_token_alloc() allocates conn->mechToken immediately via kmemdup_nul(). If a later element in the same blob is malformed, then the decoder will return nonzero after the allocation is already live. This could happen if mechListMIC [3] overrunse the enclosing SEQUENCE. decode_negotiation_token() then sets conn->use_spnego = false because both the negTokenInit and negTokenTarg grammars failed. The cleanup at the bottom of smb2_sess_setup() is gated on use_spnego: if (conn->use_spnego && conn->mechToken) { kfree(conn->mechToken); conn->mechToken = NULL; } so the kfree is skipped, causing the mechToken to never be freed. This codepath is reachable pre-authentication, so untrusted clients can cause slow memory leaks on a server without even being properly authenticated. Fix this up by not checking check for use_spnego, as it's not required, so the memory will always be properly freed. At the same time, always free the memory in ksmbd_conn_free() incase some other failure path forgot to free it. | ||||